13 The analysis in Part 2 is drawn from DellaVigna and Malmender (2004) . 8 competitive markets can reduce the prices naive consumers pay for bad contracts and sometimes will drive bad contracts out altogether. Part 5 is a Conclusion that summarizes the results, briefly illustrates how decision makers could apply them and discusses their normative implications.
Before beginning, though, attention should be called to an important normative question.
Cognitive error manifests itself in two ways: (a) the consumer cannot effectively implement her preferences; (b) the consumer has the wrong preferences (she wants to make contracts she should not make). The analysis below, consistently with the Gode and Sunder experiments, argues that markets sometimes will respond effectively to the first problem. For example, even naive consumers would rather pay low than high prices and competition lowers prices. The question is whether markets should respond to error (b) . To see why this question is serious, let market competition drive out a contract intended for the naive. This would be unfortunate if the normative goal were the maximization of persons' actual preferences; for the preferences of the naive would have been frustrated. A full normative analysis of what markets should do is outside this paper's scope, but the Conclusion will briefly argue that society should want markets to implement the consumer's ideal preferences -the preferences she would have were she sophisticated -rather than her actual preferences. If this argument persuades, then markets that respond more to the sophisticated than to the naive are performing well. A significant implication of this view holds that while it now is common to ask how cognitive error can flaw market performance, the decision maker also should ask whether the market is ameliorating cognitive error or could be helped to do so.
A Monopoly Contracting Model
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14 * is the exponential discount rate (* = 1/1+r). 
The Model
Consumers face a monopolist who offers a good or a service that is priced with a two part tariff: a lump sum payment P paid in period one (the period after making the contract) and a per use fee p that is paid in period two. A buyer (or borrower) can consume in period 1 or not. In the first version of the story, the person who consumes pays the price p and incurs an immediate consumption cost of v. Consumption generates a benefit b that is realized in period two.
Consumption thus is costly today but provides a benefit tomorrow (i.e., the current consumption cost is exercising today at the health club; the future benefit is getting stronger). The second version reverses the first: consumption yields a benefit today and a cost tommorow. Eating unhealthy food or maxing out on a credit card are examples; there is a later price to be paid.
Consumers come in three types: (a) A consumer who discounts the future exponentially (she is time consistent); (b) A consumer who discounts the future hyperbolically, and so will be time inconsistent, but who knows that she is likely to deviate from her optimal consumption path; and (c)
A consumer who discounts the future hyperbolically but is only partly aware of her weakness.
Consumer types (a) and (b) are "sophisticated" while consumer type (c) is "naive".
Consider first the case where consumption is costly today but yields future benefits. At t 0 , when a consumer signs a contract, she would like to choose consumption in period one (use the gym) if the consumption cost is less than the discounted period two benefit minus the period one user fee. A time consistent buyer can implement this plan: she consume in t 1 whenever v # *b -p.
14 A self aware time inconsistent consumer knows that she will choose less period one consumption than her t 0 self would prefer because at t 1 she will discount the future benefit too heavily; she consumes, that is, whenever v # $*b -p where $ represents the extent to which she over-weights the present (0 # $ < 1). Using words, this consumer foresees at t 0 that at t 1 the consumption cost v will weigh more heavily in her utility function relative to the future benefit b than her t 0 self prefers.
The smaller is the hyperbolic multiplier $ the greater will be the consumer's deviation from her t 0 plan.
A naive consumer, in contrast, believes that she is better able to resist temptation than she actually is. Consequently, at t 0 she thinks she will make (almost) the same cost/benefit tradeoff in t 1 that she finds preferable at the beginning (she thinks she will be a faithful gym user). Using notation, she discounts the future benefit b at $'* where $' > $. Therefore, she predicts at t 0 that she will consume in period one whenever v # $'*b -p.
The firm faces a start up cost of F and a per usage constant marginal cost of c. It thus earns the downpayment of P minus F when the consumer signs a contract and p -c if she consumes. The firm offers consumers a menu of contracts that maximize the firm's expected profits subject to the constraint that consumers do at least as well signing contracts as they would do going without the good or service.
Analysis
The contract intended for the time consistent consumer sets the user fee p* equal to the firm's marginal cost c of providing the good or service. Marginal cost pricing ensures that this consumer engages in consumption whenever consumption would generate positive surplus (whenever the current consumption cost v is less than the discounted future benefit (*b -p). The firm offers this efficient contract because, being a monopolist, it is able to capture the surplus the consumer derives from optimal use by charging a high down payment.
The time inconsistent but self aware consumer (she knows she will discount future benefits at $*) would like to pre-commit to consume appropriately in period 1 (to use the health club as often as she should). The contract intended for this consumer sets the use fee p below the firm's marginal cost (p* < c) in order to encourage consumption, making up for the resultant loss by further raising the down payment P. This self aware consumer will realize that the large down payment buys the pre-commitment -the low per use fee -that she needs. The firm offers precommitment contracts because it earns the same (monopoly) profit selling to self aware consumers that the firm earns when selling to time consistent consumers.
The naive consumer does poorly, however. The contract intended for her requires a very high downpayment and charges a use fee that is below but close to marginal cost. This consumer believes, at t 0 , that she will consume more than she actually will and so she is willing to make the high down payment in order to profit from the relatively low fee on the many uses she (incorrectly) expects to make. Put another way, she overpays up front but will not recover the overpayment through optimal consumption later on.
A time consistent consumer will choose the optimal consumption path for the second model category: goods or services whose use generates a benefit in period one but a cost in period two. A self aware time inconsistent consumer knows that she is likely to over consume in period one (to max out on a credit card or to eat too much unhealthy food) relative to the consumption path she prefers at t 0 . This consumer now wants to pre-commit not to consume excessively. The contract intended for her requires a lower down payment than the time consistent consumer pays, but sets the use fee above marginal cost. The high use fee is set to deter period one consumption, and thus contract intended for the naive consumer, who underestimates how much she will later consume, has a very high downpayment and a use fee above marginal cost but lower than the fee the self aware consumer pays. The naive consumer thus is insufficiently deterred from excessive consumption.
This analysis concerns two kinds of error: overconfidence and hyperbolic discounting (i.e., weakness of will). The results, however, likely generalize to some other cognitive mistakes. For example, consumers who know they are prey to the availability heuristic may pay firms to provide probability data; self aware boundedly rational consumers may pay for simple contracts. And to summarize, when consumers face a seller with market power, the seller will offer efficient contracts to sophisticated consumers and to consumers who are aware of their tendency to make cognitive mistakes. The seller, however, exploits naive consumers in two dimensions: it extracts all of the surplus that its contracts generate, and the contracts themselves are inefficient. Can the market do better when firms are added to the selling side?
A Search Model
The Identification Problem and the Social Goal
There is an initial question what an "irrational contract" is. To understand the question, let the market offer two categories of product: safe and unsafe. A decision maker who can distinguish between them should ban the unsafe product. If, then, one contract type is always preferred by irrational consumers and never chosen by rational consumers, and if the consumer's ideal 16 As an example, every consumer type could prefer a narrow warranty, depending on its price, but consumers who are excessively optimistic about a product's performance will prefer a narrow warranty to a broad one, cet par, because they underestimate their need for insurance. 13 preferences should rule, the decision maker should proscribe the irrational choice. There is no point to asking whether the market would eliminate an irrational contract because its existence alone answers the question.
Thus this paper can be rescued from triviality only by considering contracts that would be purchased by every consumer type -rational, knowingly irrational, unknowingly irrational -if a contract is made attractive enough, but it would be a mistake for some consumer types to buy particular versions of some contract types. As an example, consider a lending agreement with a relatively low interest rate, a high late fee and a broad security interest. A consumer who underestimates the probability of default -she is over confident regarding her earning prospectsmay borrow under the contract because she mistakenly believes that the lender will never assess the late fee or foreclose on the security interest. A consumer with the same default probability, but who correctly apprehends it, will reject the contract because for her the harsh consequences attendent on default outweigh the contract's low interest rate. On the other hand, there likely is an interest rate sufficiently low to induce this rational consumer to accept the contract despite its harsh consequences. Similarly, there likely is an interest rate sufficiently high to cause the naive consumer to reject the contract. For this paper's purposes, then, a "naive contract" has two features: (a) It is a contract that every consumer type could want; and (b) In a sense to be made precise below, it is preferred by certain consumers in consequence of the biases from which they suffer.
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On this view, a market analysis may be necessary. This is because naive contracts are 17 Because biases can partially or completely offset, correcting one bias in isolation risks causing consumers to make worse choices. See Besharov, supra note 3. Thus, the task of bias correction may require the decision maker to make an all things considered analysis. Also, some biases that experiments identify may be adaptive in life or overcome by persons' self protective strategies. See authorities cited infra notes 30 and 31. Therefore, there always is a question when an experimentally identified bias is real. The topic of government responses to bias is revisited in Part 5.3. 14 difficult to regulate. If a contract type can be both rationally and irrationally preferred, banning it must frustrate the preferences of many consumers. A possible response to this concern is to ban contracts that "a lot" of irrational consumers buy. This response would be hard to implement, however, because there is no convenient "contract/cognitive test". An agency or court cannot easily learn just what portion of potential customers for a particular contract are able to solve the cognitive challenges that the contract poses. Another policy response would be to correct the possibly applicable biases themselves, but this too would be hard to do. 17 The discussion of the monopoly model suggests that the decision maker should look at the market before attempting it.
In that model, rational and self aware irrational consumers could distinguish good from bad deals.
This makes salient the question whether competition for the business of these consumers could help the naive. If so, the regulator would face the relatively easier tasks of identifying and remedying market failure.
The model analyzed below assumes for convenience that firms may specialize in consumer types. Consumer finance companies, for example, may be more likely than banks to offer contracts that appeal to the naive. The ability of firms to specialize is captured below by supposing that some firms offer "sophisticated contract packages" while other firms offer naive contract packages. All consumer types in the model will purchase both contract types, depending on their relative prices.
The questions pursued are whether competition can reduce the prices of these contracts to competitive levels, and whether naive contracts could be driven out altogether. A little more should be said about how these inquiries relate to each other.
Naive contracts may advance a consumer's self interest. To illustrate, a consumer who is led through excessive optimism to underestimate the probability that a product is defective will buy a less comprehensive warranty than she should buy. Claims under limited warranties can be valuable, however. A market for warranties is competitive if the price of a warranty equals the firm's cost of providing it. Because narrow warranties -i.e., "wrong warranties" -are not useless, naive consumers are better off if competition causes wrong warranties to be priced at cost. Naive consumers may be worse off, however, if competition causes wrong warranties to disappear altogether. In this event, naive consumers either will buy broader but less preferred warranties or not trade. Competition thus has ambiguous welfare effects if the goal is to satisfy actual consumer preferences. This issue is best pursued after an analysis of how competition could work.
A Search Model
A firm can sell a contract, denoted X s , that is intended for sophisticated consumers, or a contract, denoted X n , that is intended for naive consumers. A contract is a set of terms that define a loan or other consumer purchase. The monopoly model described above analyzed three categories of contract, each intended for a different consumer type, but it will be convenient here to put sophisticated and mistaken but self aware consumers in the same category; the X s contract is intended for these types. Firms cannot tell which consumers are naive and which are sophisticated, but they know the distribution of consumer types. The assumption that a consumer's type is private information is made largely for realism. Though firms sometimes can gather substantial demographic data about their customers, the relation between such data and the presence of bias is 18 See Ronnlund, et al (2005) . The assumption that consumer types are private information is also made to restrict the analysis. The model here does not apply when a firm can learn, on a person by person basis, who suffers from bias in time to offer exploitative contracts to the naive. 19 The fixed cost assumption may seem unrealistic because, it is said, firms can exploit biases easily. A common example is the practice of requiring consumers to return unsatisfactory products. Consumers subject to the endowment effect allegedly will find return more costly than initial rejection, or a subsidized return, and so are exploited. See Sovern (2004) . The literature, however, offers few other examples of simple exploitation. Also, the endowment effect turns out to be more an experimental artifact than a real phenomenon. See Plott and Zeiler (2005) . In any event, the fixed cost assumption makes it marginally more likely that firms will sell the sophisticated contract than the naive contract but the restrictive search cost assumption, to be set 16 very crude. For example, consumers who make more than $100,000 a year apparently are neither more nor less likely to discount hyperbolically than consumers who make between $50,000 and $99,000 a year. Also, consumers' susceptibility to framing effects is invariant to age.
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In the model, firms have a fixed cost F i (i = s or n), produce at a constant marginal cost of c i over some range [0, z i ] and produce at an infinite marginal cost thereafter (z i thus is the firm's capacity constraint). A firm's average cost for offering a package is AC(X i ) = (F i /q) + c i , where q is output. The competitive price for a contract, which has each firm pricing contracts at average cost and selling up to capacity, thus is p i * = AC i (X i )(z i ) = (F i /z i ) + c i .
It is assumed equally costly to sell both contract types (c n = c s ), but that it is more costly for a firm to set up an exploitative system than an efficient system. The motivation for this fixed cost assumption is that it apparently is more complex for a firm to find the standard form contract that best exploits the numerous, possibly partially offsetting biases to which consumers are prone than it is for a firm to choose the terms that a utility maximizing consumer would accept. Firms also risk the lack of enforcement or liability under consumer protection statutes if their contracts too obviously exploit.out immediately below, makes it marginally less likely that firms will sell the sophisticated contract. Hence, the fixed cost assumption is not crucial to what follows. 20 Nonsequential search -using a fixed sample size -is attractive for several reasons. First, it is optimal when the outcome of search is observed with delay. For example, people often apply for several jobs at once rather than apply for a job and apply for another only after rejection. Also, when there are fixed costs to shop it often is best to visit a shopping district, spreading the cost over several store visits. Finally, using a fixed sample size is attractive to risk averse consumers because there is a serious danger of stopping too soon or too late when using a sequential search strategy against an unknown price distribution. 21 This assumption is consistent with the result that the principal determinant of search intensity in search theory experiments is search costs. See, e.g., Grether, et al (1992) . not.
The consumer purchases one product/contract package if the price is below her "limit price", to be defined below, or she does not purchase. She prefers the contract X i if she would choose X i after seeing both contracts selling at their competitive prices. To understand this concept of a preference, begin by assuming that a sophisticated consumer will purchase the contract X s at any price up to a common limit price of l s . Next recall that consumers will purchase their less preferred contract if the price of their preferred contract is too high. A sophisticated consumer thus also will purchase the naive contract X n at any price up to a common limit price of l sn . Similarly, a naive consumer will purchase X n at any price up to a common limit price of l n , and will purchase X s at any price up to a common limit of l ns . These limit prices are referred to as a consumer's "willingness to pay" for a contract type. A sophisticated consumer who sees the contracts X s and X n priced competitively would purchase X s if l s -p s * > l sn -p n *, where the left hand side of this inequality is the expected surplus the consumer would get from purchasing X s and the right hand side is the expected surplus she would get from purchasing X n , both at their competitive prices.
Rearranging terms, the sophisticated consumer would purchase X s if p n * -p s * > l sn -l s .
Sophisticated consumers probably have a greater willingness to pay for the sophisticated contract than for the naive contract (l s > l sn ). On this assumption, the right hand side of this inequality is negative. Since the left hand side is positive, the inequality always is satisfied: a sophisticated consumer who sees both contracts priced competitively will purchase the sophisticated contract.
The same reasoning implies that the naive consumer will purchase the naive contract if she sees both contracts priced competitively. Because the naive consumer is partly deluded, however, it cannot be said a priori whether her limit price for her preferred contract, l n, , exceeds the limit price 22 Some biases moderate with experience. For example, Van Den Steen (2004) states (at 1141): "The [overconfidence] bias also increases in a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of prior beliefs, but it tends to disappear with sufficient experience with the particular choice problem." Also, experience substantially improves persons' ability to do Baysian reasoning. See Harrison (1994) ; Camerer (1990) . A little more should be said about when consumers will purchase their less preferred contract. It is convenient to explain switching between contracts by focusing initially on the the naive consumer. She will purchase the sophisticated contract X s if she sees both contract types but the price for X n is "too high". The cutoff price for X n , above which the naive consumer would purchase X s , is referred to as the switching price. Recalling that the naive consumer's willingness to pay for the sophisticated contract is l ns , a naive consumer who purchases X s at its competitive price of p s * earns an expected surplus of l ns -p s *. She will reject the naive contract X n if she would earn at least as much surplus purchasing X s at p s * than she would earn by purchasing X n at the switching price. Denoting this price p n (a), the naive consumer who sees both contract types will buy X s when . Letting this be an equality and rearranging terms
yields the switching price for X n : p n (a) = l n -l ns + p s *. The price at which the sophisticated consumer switches to X n is derived similarly.
This description of the model apparently implies that naivety is a generic quality: a consumer is naive or she is not. Naivety would be context dependent, however, if consumers are more sophisticated about some contracts or contract terms than others. For example, consumers may make fewer mistakes regarding the warranty term than the prepayment penalty term because over time consumers become familiar with the need for warranty protection. 22 That consumer sophistication may vary with context could affect the results reached below in two ways. First, the less naive a consumer is the more she will pay for the sophisticated contract X s because she will (partially) recognize its virtues. In the notation used here, the limit price of naive consumers for the sophisticated contract, l ns , increases as consumer sophistication increases. When l ns goes up, the switching price p n (a) that will induce the naive consumer to reject the contract intended for her -X n --goes down. The lower is the naive switching price, Part 4 shows, the more effective comparison shopping is at lowering the price that sellers can charge for X n . Second, the less naive a consumer is, the lower will be her willingness to pay for the naive contract. Part 4 will argue, in turn, that when sophisticated consumers have a greater willingness to pay for the sophisticated contract than naive consumers have for the naive contract, or the willingnesses to pay are close, the market for the naive contract is more likely to disappear. This model applies to many of the cognitive errors that are assumed to affect consumers commercially. For example, a naive consumer may be overconfident or optimistic about her ability to pay off a loan. Because her true odds of default are higher than her perceived odds of default, she will accept more draconian default terms in return for a low interest rate than a sophisticated consumer with her default profile would take. A contract with these harsh terms is denoted X n here.
On the other hand, if the interest rate on the loan becomes too high, this consumer would switch to a contract with an even higher interest rate but less onerous penalties for nonpayment. The contract with these softer terms is denoted X s .
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Analysis
Pricing Decisions
It is helpful to begin by assuming that firms are selling both contract types at their competitive prices. Would a firm selling the naive contract X n deviate from the competitive equilibrium? Two deviations are possible: in the price dimension, from p n * to a higher price; and in the "quality" dimension, from X n to the sophisticated contract X s . Beginning with price deviations, first consider a deviation to the limit price l n . The firm would then sell only to naive nonshoppers if the willingness to pay of the sophisticated consumer for the naive contract is less than the willingness to pay of the naive consumer for the naive contract (i.e., l sn < l n ). This is a plausible condition so sophisticated nonshoppers will reject X n at its limit price. A naive shopper would see either the package X n selling elsewhere at its competitive price p n * or the package X s selling at its competitive price p s *. Since p s * is below the switching price of p n (a) 24 , neither naive nor sophisticated shoppers would purchase X n at l n .
The firm would not deviate from a competitive equilibrium to the limit price if a deviation would yield non-positive profits. This equilibrium condition is expressed as ( ) The intuition underlying condition (a) is obvious. The intuition underlying condition (b) is that the firm gains less from charging consumers the limit price when the limit is low. Regarding condition (c), the greater are the fixed costs of creating the naive contract, the more naive nonshoppers the firm needs to recover these costs.
The presence of sophisticated consumers reduces the likelihood that firms will charge excessive prices for the naive contract. To see why, realize that when firms sell the sophisticated contract X s at its competitive price, they restrict the ability of other firms to price X n at its limit. This is because the X n limit price is greater than the switching price of p n (a) so a naive shopper will either buy X n if she visits a firm that prices it competitively, or she will buy X s if her other draw is from a firm offering it. Firms could not sell X s , however, unless there were sophisticated consumers to buy it. Hence, the presence of sophisticated consumers helps to protect naive consumers from being maximally exploited in the price dimension.
A firm also could deviate from a competitive equilibrium to the lower switching price p n (a).
The firm would not sell to sophisticated shoppers. This consumer's two draws will reveal at least one firm selling the contract X s priced competitively, or one firm selling the contract X n priced competitively. Whether this firm would sell to sophisticated nonshoppers depends on whether the most such consumers would pay for the naive package (l sn ) exceeds p n (a), the switching price for naive consumers. The firm would not sell to a naive shopper whose other visit was to a firm selling the naive contract at its competitive price. On the other hand, the deviant firm would sell to naive nonshoppers and to naive shoppers whose other visit was to a firm selling X s . A firm selling X n would earn non-positive profits from a deviation to the switching price if it did not sell to sophisticated nonshoppers and if ( ) 
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The first term in Expression (2) is the firm's expected demand from naive nonshoppers and the second term is expected demand from naive shoppers. Each of them visits two firms so the probability that a shopper will visit a firm offering X n at the switching price is one half, which explains the fraction in the second term. That there is this additional term apparently makes Expression (2) harder to satisfy than (1): that is, a firm selling X n at p n * is more likely to deviate to the switching price for X n than to the limit price. This result is strengthened if the firm also would sell to sophisticated nonshoppers. On the other hand, if the naive consumers' willingness to pay for X s , l ns , is relatively high, then p n (a) will be low, making the right hand side of Expression (2) large.
Then (2) will become easy to satisfy; the firm does better pricing X n competitively than deviating to a higher price. The intuition for this result was introduced above: When the switching price for X n is low, the gain to the firm from charging it -(p n (a) -c n ) -is more likely to be below the cost -the loss of the naive shoppers who visit another firm selling X n competitively. Thus, as consumer naivety falls, comparison shopping is more effective at producing competitive prices.
This analysis of the seller's pricing decision can be summarized in Proposition One: The presence of sophisticated consumers in a market, and the penchant of both sophisticated and naive consumers to comparison shop, both increase the likelihood that firms will price naive contracts competitively.
Remark 1: Competition is beneficial in two ways. First, competition will ameliorate or eliminate the redistribution of wealth from consumers to firms. When X n is competitively priced, naive consumers realize the full surplus from buying it (l n -p n *). Second, when firms earn rents from noncompetitive pricing, new firms will enter the market to compete those rents away. As a consequence, though all firms come to earn zero pure profits the market will have too many firms.
This inefficiency is reduced as market pricing becomes more competitive because then fewer firms will enter. Finally, the model assumes for convenience that consumers engage in the minimum amount of search; shoppers visit only two firms. If consumers search more extensively, the beneficial effects of competition would be enhanced.
Remark 2: Remark 1 suggests that the number of firms is sensitive to the search strategies of consumers, but the model holds the number of firms fixed. This strategy is innocuous because the 25 Janssen and Moraga-Gonzalez (2004) develop this logic when analyzing market outcomes in a model where consumers buy a homogenous good using a nonsequential search strategy. 25 model's logic holds independently of the exact number of firms. A firm sells to a consumer either because the consumer does not compare prices, the firm's price is the lowest the consumer sees, or (in an ideal world) the consumer searches costlessly and the firm has the lowest price in the market.
If only two firms exist, having the lowest price is identical to charging a lower price than the competitor. This is also true, however, when there are infinitely many firms because the chance of being the lowest price firm in the market is negligible. In the limit, then, a firm behaves as if it is competing with just one firm for the business of shoppers. Consumers who understand firms' incentives respond by adjusting their search strategies such that the equilibrium price distributions do not depend on the number of firms.
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Remark 3: The contracting ideal, among scholars, is the "dickered term": the portion of the agreement whose content is codetermined. Dickering has less appeal when firms can use the bargaining process to learn whether consumers are mistake prone. Firms then could exploit the naive while offering good terms to the sophisticated. In contrast, in the model here the selling side drafts every term but firms cannot identify particular consumers by type. Proposition One thus suggests that consumers can be better off with anonymity plus competition than with the opportunity to bargain over terms.
Remark 4: Proposition One nevertheless may appear to describe an inefficient outcome. To see why, suppose that naive consumers somehow became sophisticated. Then, the most they would pay for the naive contract would be l sn which was shown above to be less than l s . Since the competitive price for the naive contract exceeds the competitive price for the sophisticated contract, 26 Denote the price at which a sophisticated consumer would buy the naive contract as p s (a). Then, recalling the derivation of the naive consumer's switching price, the switching price for the sophisticated consumer is p s (a) = l s -l sn + p n *, and the logic of note 21 holds here.. 26 every consumer who saw both contracts priced competitively would realize that the sophisticated contract generates greater expected surplus and buy it. Thus, that both contract types are sold appears inefficient. Recall from Part 1.3 above, however, that if the naive are not "converted", they would be buying their preferred contract at its lowest price in the competitive two contract type equilibrium; the equilibrium, that is, would be efficient on the normative benchmark of actual preferences. Remark 8 below pursues this issue further.
Contracting decisions
A second issue is whether the market for the naive contract could disappear altogether though naive consumers exist. A firm selling the contract X n at its competitive price could deviate to selling the contract X s at its limit price or at some lower price. A firm that deviated to l s would serve only sophisticated nonshoppers. The firm could not sell to naive shoppers, who would either see X s or X n priced competitively at another firm, both of which they would prefer. The firm also would not sell to naive nonshoppers because their willingness to pay for the sophisticated contract is assumed to be less than the willingness to pay of sophisticated consumers for that contract (i.e., l ns < l s ). Finally, the firm would not sell to sophisticated shoppers because their other draw would be either to a firm selling X s priced competitively or X n priced competitively. The latter price is below the sophisticated consumer's switching price. 26 Hence, a deviation from selling the naive contract at p n * to selling the sophisticated contract at its limit price would earn non-positive profits if
F l c s s s s
27 A firm selling the naive contract at its competitive price would not deviate to selling the sophisticated contract at its competitive price because the firm realizes no surplus in any competitive equilibrium.
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The important question is whether Expression (3) is harder to satisfy than Expression (1) (i.e., whether a firm is more likely to offer the sophisticated contract at its limit price than the naive contract at its limit price). The left hand side of (3) would be larger than the left hand side of (1) --deviations to X s would be more likely --if there were more sophisticated consumers than naive consumers. Also, the right hand side of Expression (1) is 8 n , a firm's comparative advantage at selling the naive contract, and the right hand side of Expression (3) is 8 s , a firm's comparative advantage at selling the sophisticated contract. Hence, if 8 s < 8 n , the right hand side of (3) would be smaller than the right hand side of (1). In this event, a firm originally offering the naive contract would be more likely to deviate in both the price dimension and the quality dimension: the firm, that is, would rather sell the sophisticated contract at its limit price than the naive contract at its limit price.
The marginal cost of selling both contract types is assumed to be the same, but the fixed costs of selling the naive contract are higher than the fixed costs of selling the sophisticated contract.
Thus, firms will have a comparative advantage at selling the sophisticated contract if sophisticated consumers have a higher willingness to pay for X s than naive consumers have a willingness to pay for X n (i.e., l s > l n ); or if the two willingnesses to pay are sufficiently close.
Next consider a deviation from X n to X s at the switching price of p s (a.) 27 The analysis of this deviation is similar to the analysis for the naive switching price above. A firm that deviates to selling the sophisticated contract X s at its switching price would sell to sophisticated nonshoppers, to sophisticated shoppers whose other draw was at a firm selling the naive contract X n and to naive naive contracts are more likely to disappear than in the analysis here because firms offering naive contracts could not sell to sophisticated consumers at any price. A possibly more realistic assumption is that sophisticated consumers will purchase some naive contract types but not others.
The rejected contracts may be the most exploitative.
Remark 8: Eliminating naive contracts would be undesirable if actual consumer preferences are the normative benchmark. When firms sell the sophisticated contract at its limit price, no naive consumers would purchase; and when firms sell the sophisticated contract at its switching price, naive consumers would buy it only if their limit price for that contract exceeds the switching price (l ns > p s (a)). Recalling that naive consumers get surplus from the contract intended for them, competition that eliminates the naive contract creates welfare losses.
Conclusion
Summary
Consumers may be partitioned in three ways: some consumers do not make cognitive errors; some consumers are error prone, but know they are; and some consumers are error prone but think they are not. Theory shows that firms with market power will offer contracts that are optimal for the first two consumer types but which exploit the third. Naive consumers are offered naive -that is, bad -contracts, and pay monopoly prices for them. The first result carries over when market competition is introduced on the selling side: firms will offer optimal contracts to rational and to self aware consumers. The second result may change, however. Though naive consumers may still be offered bad contracts, those contracts are less likely to be sold at monopoly prices. Also, firms sometimes will offer good contracts to every consumer type. The intuition underlying these results now is easy to state: If some consumers are sophisticated while others are naive but firms cannot tell into which class a consumer falls, and if all consumer types will shop for low prices and preferred contracts, then competition among firms for the marginal consumer will lower the price of every contract type. Further, if there are enough sophisticated consumers, and if the other consumers are not very naive -they have a relatively low willingness to pay for bad contracts --, only good contracts will exist in equilibrium.
Normative issues
Driving out naive contracts may be thought morally problematic. If naive consumers do not lose their errors, they will experience welfare losses if competition causes their preferred contract to disappear. 28 There are two arguments, briefly sketched here, that these losses should not count.
Both hold that the consumer's idealized preferences -those she would have were she sophisticatedshould control. The first argument is in a Rawlsian vein, and goes like this: Consider a person who knows that she will be a consumer during her adult life but does not know if she will turn out to be sophisticated or naive. She is told to assume the following: (a) She may be a sophisticated consumer or a naive consumer; (b) If (or when) she is sophisticated, she would purchase the sophisticated contract, had she a choice, because that contract would maximize her expected monetary return; (c)
Her consumption choices affect only herself. Would she prefer the market to increase the difficulty of making naive choices or be neutral toward those choices? Assumption (b) implies that at every time in her life, and at the end, she would have more wealth if she acted on sophisticated preferences than if she acted on naive preferences. Assumption (c) implies that she would not increase the chance that naive contracts would be sold were she to forego wealth in order to become a customer 29 Persons exhibit altruistic preferences when playing experimental demand games: the demander tends to choose what she regards as the fair share of the sum the players are to divide rather than the much larger payoff her power in the game could command. The demander, however, knows the payoff of the other player precisely, and knows that she can entirely determine that payoff. That both players know that the demander has both power and perfect knowledge supports either of two inferences: the demander actually is altruistic or the demander fears a hostile rejection of greedy offers. Schmitt (2004) supports the latter interpretation and Camerer (2003) at 115 summarizes studies showing that when persons play market games, where they do not know the payoffs of other players and cannot affect those payoffs, altruistic preferences disappear. 31 for naive contracts. The three assumptions together thus imply that she would prefer the market to make naive preferences more difficult to satisfy.
Respecting the realism of the last two assumptions, sophisticated contracts will generally increase the consumer's expected wealth relative to naive contracts. Thus, the right debt contract reduces the consumer's bankruptcy risk while the wrong one may increase it, and the right warranty contract reduces the risk that the consumer will have to pay the full price for defective goods while the wrong warranty contract leaves that risk relatively untouched. Assumption (b) thus seems correct. Assumption (c) also holds because, in the mass markets considered here, a particular consumer's choice of a naive contract would not materially increase the availability of that contract for other consumers. Markets, that is, make the pursuit of altruistic preferences largely futile.
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Original position arguments rest on the premise that persons in the original position are relevantly alike. The argument here rests on the same premise. It supposes everyone to prefer more to less, ceteris paribus, and contends that in large markets the ceteris paribus condition holds.
The second argument for counting only consumers' ideal preferences is more directly utilitarian. It claims, simply, that the preferences a utilitarian should sum must be worth summing.
There can be considerable controversy as which preferences belong in the "summable set", but an 30 Besharov, supra note 3. Also, overconfidence helps to overcome anxiety about whether one can do a task. See Compte and Postlewaite (2004) . For other examples, pessimistic consumers who make overly high projections of future consumption needs may not under-save, Rabin (1999) , and the self-serving bias, to the extent it actually exists, may be adaptive. Kaplan and Ruffle (2004) . See also Krueger and Funder (2004) at 319: "As soon as one asks whether changes in one bias may result in changes in others, one moves toward a more comprehensive model."
31 A decision maker also may have to consider the efforts of persons to overcome biases through internal systems of control. Considerable evidence exists that a person forms her self image by inducting the kind of person she is from her past actions. Because persons have 32 argument that the set should include irrational preferences is hard to make.
Applications
Market responses to cognitive error also can be malign: bad contracts and high prices likely exist. This raises difficult questions for decision makers because whether an actual contract is good or bad depends on context and consumers' cognitive styles: the same contract could be optimal for some consumers and suboptimal for others. The two immediate implications of this possibility are that the existence of several contract types in a market cannot itself demonstrate that cognitive error is pervasive, and that banning particular contract types would usually frustrate the preferences of many consumers. A second policy response is to correct disadvantaging biases. Apart from consumer education in schools, this response is difficult to implement: that biases may offset implies that the task of bias correction makes great informational demands on the decision maker. As an example, present oriented persons may choose suboptimal effort levels when pursuing projects with delayed payoffs. A person who is excessively confident of his ability to control outcomes, however, may overcome this bad incentive if his misplaced optimism causes him to overrate the probability of success.
30 When offsetting errors are welfare enhancing, correcting one error must be welfare reducing. This suggests that the task of bias correction is best conducted holistically.
imperfect recall (they cannot fully evaluate the wisdom of past choices), they develop "personal rules" to guide behavior. It is easier to recall whether one violated a rule. The cost of violating a rule may be large: missing a scheduled exercise day will reduce fitness only by a little but may contribute substantially to the person's view that she really is slothful. That perception, in turn, may cause the person to miss a lot of exercise days. Soman and Cheema (2004) provide evidence of this phenomenon. Their evidence suggests that a person who fears she suffers from weakness of will may develop a saving rule that she is quite reluctant to break. Benabou and Tirole (2004) formalize this idea in a model which shows, among other things, "that agents with hyperbolic discounting can actually behave as though they overweighed the future rather than the present." (at 850; emphasis in original). That persons exhibit inconsistent discount rates in experiments thus should not, of itself, lead a decision maker to conclude that people are time inconsistent when they make real world choices. Evidence regarding what people actually do is difficult for institutions such as courts to obtain, however.
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there are large and difficult questions as to which legal institution would be good at error reduction and how that institution should proceed.
That markets may help suggests a different mode of response: to improve market performance. There are two well known tools: to facilitate comparison shopping by requiring common terms in consumer contracts to be cast in standard forms; and to require the language in those forms to be accessible to the average reader. A possible third tool is to require firms to provide consumers with bias reducing information. This paper briefly illustrates these possible policy responses by analyzing how the model applies to credit card contracts. Every extant credit card contract could be preferred by every consumer type, but not every consumer should prefer every contract. Some companies offer credit cards with high introductory charges, relatively low monthly interest rates and a variety of ancillary services. Other companies offer cards with no initial charges, low interest rates for an introductory period, high interest rates thereafter and few ancillary services. Letting income be a rough proxy for sophistication, sophisticated consumers could prefer the former card because they are likely to use the services (easier reservations at expensive restaurants and clubs, for example) and are 32 Put more precisely, if C(L) is the total cost of a loan, then C(L) = r + tc where r is the interest rate and tc are transaction costs. Then C(L) card may be less then C(L) bank though r card > r bank if tc card << tc bank . 34 relatively indifferent to the interest rate on an outstanding balance, which these consumers plausibly expect never to have. This credit card contract would be an X s contract.
The stripped down version with no initial charges and high later rates could appeal to both sophisticated and naive types, however. A consumer who does not make errors and who is not interested in the ancillary services could prefer this contract for two reasons. First, it is costless to make. Second, though nominal credit card interest rates are high relative to other credit sources, the total cost of a credit card loan may be lower than the total cost of alternate financial sources because credit card borrowing has low transaction costs. The debtor gets the money without providing the lender with a credit history or income and employment data, or having an interview.
32 A self aware error prone consumer also could prefer the stripped down card because of the high later interest rate.
This consumer wants to make future borrowing difficult because she knows she is likely otherwise to borrow too much. Agreeing to a contract that requires high rates and substantial late fees thus can be a type of pre-commitment: the excessive cost of excessive borrowing can deter the consumer from deviating from her financial plan.
The stripped down credit card also could be regarded as a naive contract, however. To see why, consider a consumer who commonly makes two cognitive mistakes: she discounts the future hyperbolically and she is overconfident. Weakness of will leads her, in a later period, to spend a larger fraction of her income than she planned to spend. To do this, she uses her credit card to borrow, mistakenly believing that she will promptly repay. The stripped down credit card may be considered an X n contract because the card can disadvantage these naive types. The ease of making 33 See Bar Gill (2004) . Credit card defaults increased substantially in the 1990s but the cause apparently was lower default costs rather than a worsening of card holder risk profiles (i.e., more naive consumers making contracts). See Gross and Souleles (2002) . These results do not speak to the question whether too many naive consumers had already been borrowing under the X n credit card contract.
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the contract together with the low initial interest rate lures the naive consumer into the arrangement and the later high rate exploits her.
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To summarize, sophisticated consumers generally prefer the X s card, but some of these consumers will borrow under the X n card and more of them would do so if firms set the introductory charge for X s too high. Naive consumers commonly prefer the X n card but some could come to prefer the X s card with its low monthly rate if the introductory charge fell sufficiently. Since all consumer types can prefer all card types, no type should be banned. This market would be performing poorly, however, if too many naive consumers borrowed under the X n card and if the prices for both contract types were too high.
If good and bad contracts are partly person relative, there is a question how the regulator would know when to intervene. The model suggests that problems may exist if particular contract types sold at widely disparate prices. Considerable price dispersion indicates that some consumers are paying supracompetitive prices. Also, considerable price dispersion suggests that too few consumers comparison shop. The less comparison shopping there is, the more likely it is that the naive contract is profitable to sell.
The state could attempt to improve the functioning of a badly performing credit card market by requiring common terms in all credit card contracts, not only the annual percentage rate, to be quoted in standard, easy to understand language. This would facilitate comparison shopping by all consumers both for contract types and for low rates. Regarding the third possible market improving 34 Jolls and Sunstein (2004) , at 40-46, discuss the need for and the potential efficacy of providing consumers with information of this type. 36 response, a credit card company could be required to present consumers with a short description of default rates together with a statement that not every borrower can be above average (that consumers are better advised to consider themselves average than good). Because some persons are better able to absorb narrative than to evaluate statistics, an alternative disclosure mode would have firms providing consumers with scenario information: stories about persons who got in over their heads.
Either form of disclosure could reduce consumer naivety by moderating any overconfidence bias.
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When naivety falls, market performance improves.
None of these responses guarantees that only good contracts will be offered at competitive prices. But since it would be a mistake to ban any of these contract types, and since correcting the biases that may cause some consumers to borrow excessively under them would be extraordinarily difficult, focusing on the competitive process seems a promising policy option. Markets may be easier to improve than people.
